Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39784 
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dc.contributor.authorKuhn, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorGundlach, Erichen
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-12-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-08T07:48:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-08T07:48:14Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39784-
dc.description.abstractWe consider resource allocation within an organisation and show how delegation bears on moral hazard and adverse selection when agents have a preference for autonomy. Agents may care about autonomy for reasons of job-satisfaction, status or greater reputation when performing well under autonomy. Separating allocations (overall budget and degree of delegation) are characterised depending on the preference for autonomy. As the latter increases, the degree of delegation assigned to productive and unproductive agents converges. If agents' preferences for monetary rewards are weak, the principal will not employ financial transfers. Pooling then arises under a strong preference for autonomy.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Rostock, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cRostocken
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aThünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory - Working Paper |x69en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelG31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordcapital budgetingen
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen
dc.subject.keywordintrinsic motivationen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.titleDelegating budgets when agents care about autonomy-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610342940en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:roswps:69en

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