Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39784
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dc.contributor.authorKuhn, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorGundlach, Erichen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-08T07:48:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-08T07:48:14Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39784-
dc.description.abstractWe consider resource allocation within an organisation and show how delegation bears on moral hazard and adverse selection when agents have a preference for autonomy. Agents may care about autonomy for reasons of job-satisfaction, status or greater reputation when performing well under autonomy. Separating allocations (overall budget and degree of delegation) are characterised depending on the preference for autonomy. As the latter increases, the degree of delegation assigned to productive and unproductive agents converges. If agents' preferences for monetary rewards are weak, the principal will not employ financial transfers. Pooling then arises under a strong preference for autonomy.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak. |cRostocken_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aThünen-series of applied economic theory |x69en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelG31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcapital budgetingen_US
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordintrinsic motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.titleDelegating budgets when agents care about autonomyen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn610342940en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:roswps:69-

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