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dc.contributor.authorLibman, Alexanderen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-03T08:14:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-03T08:14:46Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39662-
dc.description.abstractThe paper discusses the relative importance of the 'real' political actions versus the changes of symbolic nature in the bargaining over devolution, studying the case of personnel decentralization in security agencies in Russia in 2000-2007. While in the 1990s under Boris Yeltsin regional branches of federal ministries in Russia were mostly captured by regional governors, allowing them to pass acts directly contradicting federal law, in 2000s the administration of Vladimir Putin gradually replaced the heads of regional branches by new bureaucrats, supposedly without any connections to the region. The results differ for different security agencies; however, the paper finds, surprisingly, that in several cases the appointment decisions were robustly influenced rather by symbolic gestures made by regional governments in the earlier bargaining process than by the actual devolution policies of the regions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFrankfurt School of Finance & Management Frankfurt, M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series // Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 148en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelP26en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDevolutionen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordtransition economiesen_US
dc.subject.stwZentralstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwRegionalverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwRusslanden_US
dc.titleWords or deeds - what matters? Experience of recentralization in Russian security agenciesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn633719315en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:148-
Appears in Collections:Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

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