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Title:Asymmetrically dominated alternatives and random incentive mechanisms PDF Logo
Authors:Schmidt, Ulrich
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Kiel working paper 1646
Abstract:This note presents an experimental study of the random lottery incentive mechanism. In the baseline treatment we observe risk behavior in a given choice problem. We show that by integrating a second, asymmetrically dominated choice problem in a random incentive mechanism risk behavior can be manipulated systematically. This implies that the isolation hypothesis is violated the random incentive mechanism does not elicit true preferences.
Subjects:Random incentive mechanism
isolation
asymmetrically dominated alternatives
JEL:C91
D81
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW

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