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Title:Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy PDF Logo
Authors:Farvaque, Etienne
Lagadec, Gaël
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:ZEI working paper B 01-2001
Abstract:While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely stands on the …ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a decision structure for monetary policy rules.
Subjects:Partisan Theory
Policy Boards
Monetary Union
JEL:E50
E58
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:ZEI Working Papers, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Universität Bonn

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