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ZEI Working Papers, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39646
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| Title: | | Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy  |
| Authors: | | Farvaque, Etienne Lagadec, Gaël |
| Issue Date: | | 2001 |
| Series/Report no.: | | ZEI working paper B 01-2001 |
| Abstract: | | While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely stands on the …ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a decision structure for monetary policy rules. |
| Subjects: | | Partisan Theory Policy Boards Monetary Union |
| JEL: | | E50 E58 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | ZEI Working Papers, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Universität Bonn
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