Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39562
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dc.contributor.authorDiTella, Rafaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorMacCulloch, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:48:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:48:00Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39562-
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of unemployment benefit provision when the family is also aprovider of social insurance. As a benchmark, a simple model is presented where risksharingmotives govern intra-family transfers and more generous unemploymentbenefits, provided by the State, crowd out family risk-sharing arrangements one-forone.The model is then extended to capture the idea that the State has an advantagevis-a-vis the family in the provision of insurance because it can tax individuals,whereas the family must rely on self-enforcing agreements. In this case, the effect ofState transfers on intra-family transfers is found to be more than one-for-one. Thus,somewhat perversely, both informal transfers and total insurance transfers to theunemployed fall as the State's generosity increases. This does not imply that theoptimal Welfare State is zero. Our results still hold when families are assumed to bebetter than the State at monitoring the job search activities of the unemployed.-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZEI |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI working paper |xB 23-1999en_US
dc.subject.jelH42-
dc.subject.jelH53-
dc.subject.jelD1-
dc.subject.jelI38-
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSelf-enforcing contracts-
dc.subject.keywordOptimal welfare generosity-
dc.subject.stwSozialstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilieen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivater Transferen_US
dc.subject.stwSelbsthilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen_US
dc.titleInformal family insurance and the design of the welfare stateen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn825506530en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B231999-

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