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dc.contributor.authorDiTella, Rafaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorMacCulloch, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:48:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:48:00Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39562-
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of unemployment benefit provision when the family is also a provider of social insurance. As a benchmark, a simple model is presented where risksharing motives govern intra-family transfers and more generous unemployment benefits, provided by the State, crowd out family risk-sharing arrangements one-forone. The model is then extended to capture the idea that the State has an advantage vis-a-vis the family in the provision of insurance because it can tax individuals, whereas the family must rely on self-enforcing agreements. In this case, the effect of State transfers on intra-family transfers is found to be more than one-for-one. Thus, somewhat perversely, both informal transfers and total insurance transfers to the unemployed fall as the State's generosity increases. This does not imply that the optimal Welfare State is zero. Our results still hold when families are assumed to be better than the State at monitoring the job search activities of the unemployed.-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZEI Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEI working paper B 23-1999en_US
dc.subject.jelH42-
dc.subject.jelH53-
dc.subject.jelD1-
dc.subject.jelI38-
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSelf-enforcing contracts-
dc.subject.keywordOptimal welfare generosity-
dc.subject.stwSozialstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilieen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivater Transferen_US
dc.subject.stwSelbsthilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwCrowding outen_US
dc.titleInformal family insurance and the design of the welfare stateen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn309109051en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B231999-
Appears in Collections:ZEI Working Papers, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Universität Bonn

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