Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39543
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dc.contributor.authorBrückner, Matthiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:47:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:47:40Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39543-
dc.description.abstractThe literature on tax competition generally concludes that international coordinationof capital taxes among symmetric countries increases tax rates. This paperinvestigates whether this conclusion also holds in a political economy frameworkwhere taxes are set by elected policy makers. It shows that policy makers are fiscallymore liberal than the average citizen if taxes are set non-cooperatively. However,fiscally more conservative policy makers are elected if taxes are set cooperatively.The introduction of tax coordination cannot remove the incentive to compete forforeign capital, but simply shifts it to the election stage. The paper proves thatwith standard specifications of the utility functions, coordination leads to lower taxrates than competition.-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZEI |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI working paper |xB 22-2001en_US
dc.subject.jelH2-
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax competition-
dc.subject.keywordtax coordination-
dc.subject.keywordstrategic delegation-
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwMedian Voteren_US
dc.titleStrategic delegation and international capital taxationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn825506034en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B222001-

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