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dc.contributor.authorBrückner, Matthiasen_US
dc.description.abstractThe literature on tax competition generally concludes that international coordination of capital taxes among symmetric countries increases tax rates. This paper investigates whether this conclusion also holds in a political economy framework where taxes are set by elected policy makers. It shows that policy makers are fiscally more liberal than the average citizen if taxes are set non-cooperatively. However, fiscally more conservative policy makers are elected if taxes are set cooperatively. The introduction of tax coordination cannot remove the incentive to compete for foreign capital, but simply shifts it to the election stage. The paper proves that with standard specifications of the utility functions, coordination leads to lower tax rates than competition.-
dc.publisherZEI Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesZEI working paper B 22-2001en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax competition-
dc.subject.keywordtax coordination-
dc.subject.keywordstrategic delegation-
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwMedian Voteren_US
dc.titleStrategic delegation and international capital taxationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:ZEI Working Papers, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Universität Bonn

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