Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39480 
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dc.contributor.authorGonzález-König, Gabrielen
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:46:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:46:48Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39480-
dc.description.abstractIn the absence of altruism, there is no obvious reason why a migrant should remit part of his income to his family for investment at the home location. If the family invests such income (in housing for example), why would they give it back to the migrant when he returns? This paper is based on the idea that certain people at a migrant's home location may punish those families who do not return those investments in order to prevent their own possibilities of receiving future remittances and investments from being adversely affected. We find that in equilibrium we can have remittances to be invested and given back to the migrant and remittances for private consumption by the migrant's family even in the complete absence of altruism on either the part of the migrant or his family.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI Working Paper |xB 08-2005en
dc.subject.jelJ61en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRemittancesen
dc.subject.keywordAltruismen
dc.subject.keywordMigrationen
dc.subject.stwRücküberweisung (Migranten)en
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwMigrationstheorieen
dc.titleRemittances as investment in the absence of altruism-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn512933901en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B082005en

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