Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39472
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kletzer, Kenneth M. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-01T09:46:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-01T09:46:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1997 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39472 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The implications of monetary unification for fiscal policies are discussed. The rolesof nominal exchange rate flexibility in the presence of asymmetric national shocks andnominal price rigidities as an automatic stabilizer and source of disturbances to real economicperformance are reviewed. Two main themes are considered. The first is whether a systemof fiscal insurance across member states qualitatively replicates the effects of autonomousmonetary policy instruments when exchange rates are permanently fixed. It is argued thatwhile fiscal insurance schemes increase the instruments available to fiscal authorities toinfluence resource allocation, they do not augment existing fiscal instruments in a manner thatreplicates monetary policy under long-run monetary neutrality in an overlapping generationseconomy. Restrictions imposed on national fiscal instruments as a condition of monetaryunification may give rise to a need for fiscal insurance to replace their role as stabilizers. Thesecond theme addresses whether political unification is a necessary logical conclusion of theusefulness of fiscal insurance scheme. The argument that sustainable insurance arrangementscan be devised without foregoing national sovereignty over fiscal policymaking is discussed. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aZEI Working Paper |xB 04-1997 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F42 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E6 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | monetary union | en |
dc.subject.keyword | exchange rate regimes | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fiscal insurance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fiscal policy coordination | en |
dc.subject.stw | Währungsunion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzföderalismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schock | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ov | en |
dc.title | Macroeconomic stabilization with a common currency: Does European Monetary Unification create a need for fiscal insurance of federalism? | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 824005449 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B041997 | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.