Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39472
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dc.contributor.authorKletzer, Kenneth M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:46:42Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:46:42Z-
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39472-
dc.description.abstractThe implications of monetary unification for fiscal policies are discussed. The rolesof nominal exchange rate flexibility in the presence of asymmetric national shocks andnominal price rigidities as an automatic stabilizer and source of disturbances to real economicperformance are reviewed. Two main themes are considered. The first is whether a systemof fiscal insurance across member states qualitatively replicates the effects of autonomousmonetary policy instruments when exchange rates are permanently fixed. It is argued thatwhile fiscal insurance schemes increase the instruments available to fiscal authorities toinfluence resource allocation, they do not augment existing fiscal instruments in a manner thatreplicates monetary policy under long-run monetary neutrality in an overlapping generationseconomy. Restrictions imposed on national fiscal instruments as a condition of monetaryunification may give rise to a need for fiscal insurance to replace their role as stabilizers. Thesecond theme addresses whether political unification is a necessary logical conclusion of theusefulness of fiscal insurance scheme. The argument that sustainable insurance arrangementscan be devised without foregoing national sovereignty over fiscal policymaking is discussed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZEI |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI working paper |xB 04-1997en_US
dc.subject.jelF41-
dc.subject.jelF42-
dc.subject.jelE6-
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary union-
dc.subject.keywordexchange rate regimes-
dc.subject.keywordfiscal insurance-
dc.subject.keywordfiscal policy coordination-
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwSchocken_US
dc.subject.stwOven_US
dc.titleMacroeconomic stabilization with a common currency: Does European Monetary Unification create a need for fiscal insurance of federalism?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn824005449en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B041997-

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