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dc.contributor.authorAngerhausen, Juliaen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the bahavior of a principal with bounded memory who can offer a two-period performance-based contract to an agent. In the model he can choose whether to evaluate the agent after each period or only at the end of the second period. If the agent is wealth-constrained, the option to evaluate him twice can be profitable. But without the constraint on the part of the agent, the principal will always prefer to evaluate only once in order to reduce evaluation costs. Finally we consider a modification leads us to a trade-off between more and less frequent evaluations.en_US
dc.publisherUniv., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak. Dortmunden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge 05-06en_US
dc.subject.keywordPerformance evaluationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbounded memoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen_US
dc.titleEvaluation frequency and forgetful principalsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge, Lst. f. VWL, TU Dortmund

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