Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39439
Authors: 
Angerhausen, Julia
Bayer, Christian
Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge 06-02
Abstract: 
We propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from his working history. Employers will exploit their knowledge offering low wages to this individual unemployment to signal a high reservation wage.
Subjects: 
strategic unemployment
asymmetric information
wage bargaining
minimum wage
JEL: 
D82
J30
J64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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