EconStor >
Technische Universität Dortmund >
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Dortmund >
Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge, Lst. f. VWL, TU Dortmund >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAngerhausen, Juliaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBayer, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorHehenkamp, Burkharden_US
dc.description.abstractWe propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from his working history. Employers will exploit their knowledge offering low wages to this individual unemployment to signal a high reservation wage.en_US
dc.publisherUniv., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak. Dortmunden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge 06-02en_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic unemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordwage bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen_US
dc.titleStrategic unemploymenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge, Lst. f. VWL, TU Dortmund

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
612025799.pdf238.19 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.