Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39438
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-31T12:14:57Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-31T12:14:57Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39438-
dc.description.abstractIn the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak. |cDortmunden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge |x06-01en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSequential all-pay auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomplete informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneralized costen_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneralized Stackelberg gameen_US
dc.titleThe generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete informationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612025071en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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