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Title:The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information PDF Logo
Authors:Konrad, Kai A.
Leininger, Wolfgang
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge 06-01
Abstract:In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.
Subjects:Sequential all-pay auction
complete information
generalized cost
generalized Stackelberg game
JEL:D72
D74
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge, Lst. f. VWL, TU Dortmund

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