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dc.contributor.authorHehenkamp, Burkharden_US
dc.description.abstractInvestigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.en_US
dc.publisherUniv., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak. Dortmunden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge 05-05en_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic advantageen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterdependent preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordaction monotonicityen_US
dc.titleThe strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge, Lst. f. VWL, TU Dortmund

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