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Title:The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games PDF Logo
Authors:Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge 05-05
Abstract:Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.
Subjects:strategic advantage
interdependent preferences
spillovers
action monotonicity
JEL:C72
D72
C79
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge, Lst. f. VWL, TU Dortmund

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