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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39346
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| Title: | | Information asymmetry and the problem of transfers in trade negotiations and international agencies  |
| Authors: | | Hamada, Koichi Sunder, Shyam |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 910 |
| Abstract: | | This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations. We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a transfer process uses up additional resources. The difficulty of making transfers renders it less likely that a nation would find it individually rational to participate as a member of an international institution. Costly transfers render the internal and international adjustment difficult, and serve as a barrier to trade liberalization. Costly international transfers harden the resistance against trade liberalization in the (potentially) recipient country and soften it in the (potentially) donor country. |
| Subjects: | | International trade tariff negotiation asymmetric information transfer WTO common agency two-level game |
| JEL: | | O82 F13 H21 H71 H77 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University
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