Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39333 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2010,027
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential regulator can in general not mitigate a bank's failure risk solely by means of liquidity requirements. However, their effectiveness can be restored if, in addition, minimum capital requirements are met. This provides a rationale for capital requirements beyond the commonly envoked reasoning that they are to be used to control the riskiness of banks' asset portfolios.
Schlagwörter: 
prudential regulation
liquidity requirements
minimum capital requirements
global games
JEL: 
G21
G28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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