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Title:Dynamic systems of social interactions PDF Logo
Authors:Horst, Ulrich
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:SFB 649 discussion paper 2010,012
Abstract:We state conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in evolutionary models with an infinity of locally and globally interacting agents. Agents face repeated discrete choice problems. Their utility depends on the actions of some designated neighbors and the average choice throughout the whole population. We show that the dynamics on the level of aggregate behavior can be described by a deterministic measure-valued integral equation. If some form of positive complementarities prevails we establish convergence and ergodicity results for aggregate activities. We apply our convergence results to study a class of population games with random matching.
Subjects:evolutionary dynamics
social interaction
equilibrium
interacting particle systems
coordination games
JEL:C63
D50
D71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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