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Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39325
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| Title: | | Dynamic systems of social interactions  |
| Authors: | | Horst, Ulrich |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | SFB 649 discussion paper 2010,012 |
| Abstract: | | We state conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in evolutionary models with an infinity of locally and globally interacting agents. Agents face repeated discrete choice problems. Their utility depends on the actions of some designated neighbors and the average choice throughout the whole population. We show that the dynamics on the level of aggregate behavior can be described by a deterministic measure-valued integral equation. If some form of positive complementarities prevails we establish convergence and ergodicity results for aggregate activities. We apply our convergence results to study a class of population games with random matching. |
| Subjects: | | evolutionary dynamics social interaction equilibrium interacting particle systems coordination games |
| JEL: | | C63 D50 D71 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin
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