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dc.contributor.authorFasten, Erik R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHofmann, Dirken_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-26T11:56:58Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-26T11:56:58Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39306-
dc.description.abstractCertifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing asymmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If the seller demands a rating, the certifier announces the product quality publicly, whereas if the buyer requests a rating it remains his private information. The model shows that the certifier offers his service to sellers and buyers to maximize his own profit with a higher share from the sellers. Overall, certifiers increase welfare in specific markets. Revenue shifts due to the financial crisis are also explained.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSFB 649, Economic Risk Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSFB 649 discussion paper 2010,007en_US
dc.subject.jelG14en_US
dc.subject.jelG24en_US
dc.subject.jelL15en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCertificationen_US
dc.subject.keywordRating Agenciesen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordFinancial Marketsen_US
dc.subject.stwRatingagenturen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzdienstleistungen_US
dc.subject.stwKreditwürdigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwMonopolen_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.titleTwo-sided certification: The market for rating agenciesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn623836602en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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