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Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, Humboldt-Universität Berlin >
SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39284
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Strausz, Roland | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-08-31 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-26T11:56:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-26T11:56:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39284 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | I investigate the argument that, in a twoparty system with different regulatory objectives, political uncertainty generates regulatory risk. I show that this risk has a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an outputexpansion effect that benefits one party. Consequently, at least one party dislikes regulatory risk. Moreover, both political parties gain from eliminating regulatory risk when political divergence is small or the winning probability of the regulatoryriskaverse party is not too large. Because of a commitment problem, direct political bargaining is insufficient to eliminate regulatory risk. Politically independent regulatory agencies solve this commitment problem. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | SFB 649, Economic Risk Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | SFB 649 discussion paper 2009,040 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Regulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | regulatory risk | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | political economy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | independent regulatory agency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Regulierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politische Entscheidung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risiko | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Aufsichtsbehörde | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Selbstverwaltung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The political economy of regulatory risk | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 607928964 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin
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