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dc.contributor.authorTheuringer, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeiss, Piaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-25T11:28:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-25T11:28:34Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39250-
dc.description.abstractWe discuss the effects of AD-protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence. In an AD-regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum-price rule in addition to existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg one, we find that AD-rules distort competition. We show that AD-protection increases the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and minimum prices. When entrance costs are high, consumer welfare is lower in an AD- regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD-protection facilitates the abuse of market dominance.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInstitut für Wirtschaftspolitik Kölnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIWP discussion paper 2001/3en_US
dc.subject.jelF14en_US
dc.subject.jelL40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAnti-dumpingen_US
dc.subject.keywordabuse of market dominanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic firm behaviouren_US
dc.subject.stwAntidumpingen_US
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDo anti-dumping rules facilitate the abuse of market dominance?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn378730398en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:iwp Discussion Papers, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, Universität Köln

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