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iwp Discussion Papers, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, Universität Köln >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39250
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| Title: | | Do anti-dumping rules facilitate the abuse of market dominance?  |
| Authors: | | Theuringer, Martin Weiss, Pia |
| Issue Date: | | 2001 |
| Series/Report no.: | | IWP discussion paper 2001/3 |
| Abstract: | | We discuss the effects of AD-protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence. In an AD-regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum-price rule in addition to existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg one, we find that AD-rules distort competition. We show that AD-protection increases the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and minimum prices. When entrance costs are high, consumer welfare is lower in an AD- regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD-protection facilitates the abuse of market dominance. |
| Subjects: | | Anti-dumping abuse of market dominance strategic firm behaviour |
| JEL: | | F14 L40 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | iwp Discussion Papers, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, Universität Köln
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