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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39033
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| Title: | | Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting  |
| Authors: | | Itaya, Jun-ichi Okamura, Makoto Yamaguchi, Chikara |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper Public Finance 3127 |
| Abstract: | | This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable. |
| Subjects: | | partial tax coordination repeated game tax competition |
| JEL: | | H71 H77 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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