Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39024
Authors: 
Haupt, Alexander
Stadejek, Magdalena
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Resources and Environment 2986
Abstract: 
We analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of policy instruments. Surprisingly, we find that an industry-friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax product standard, but shies away from subsidies to firms. By contrast, a consumer-friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and in addition implements a moderate subsidy to firms, but avoids energy taxes.
Subjects: 
energy tax
energy efficiency standard
subsidy
vertically differentiated markets
product quality
JEL: 
Q58
Q48
L13
L15
L50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
321.17 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.