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Title:The choice of environmental policy instruments: Energy efficiency and redistribution PDF Logo
Authors:Haupt, Alexander
Stadejek, Magdalena
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper Resources and Environment 2986
Abstract:We analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of policy instruments. Surprisingly, we find that an industry-friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax product standard, but shies away from subsidies to firms. By contrast, a consumer-friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and in addition implements a moderate subsidy to firms, but avoids energy taxes.
Subjects:energy tax
energy efficiency standard
subsidy
vertically differentiated markets
product quality
JEL:Q58
Q48
L13
L15
L50
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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