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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39009
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dreher, Axel | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Klasen, Stephan | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Vreeland, James Raymond | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Werker, Eric | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-03-31 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-18T11:19:31Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-18T11:19:31Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39009 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper Public Finance 2993 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O19 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O11 : F35 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | World Bank | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | aid effectiveness | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | political influence | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | United Nations Security Council | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklungshilfe | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklungsfinanzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklungsprojekt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Projektbewertung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Public Choice | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationale Organisation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationale Sicherheit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Mitgliedschaft | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Auslandsverschuldung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Welt | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 622844709 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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