EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39009
  
Title:The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? PDF Logo
Authors:Dreher, Axel
Klasen, Stephan
Vreeland, James Raymond
Werker, Eric
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper Public Finance 2993
Abstract:As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.
Subjects:World Bank
aid effectiveness
political influence
United Nations Security Council
JEL:O19
O11
F35
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
622844709.pdf326.39 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39009

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.