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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39009
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| Title: | | The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?  |
| Authors: | | Dreher, Axel Klasen, Stephan Vreeland, James Raymond Werker, Eric |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper Public Finance 2993 |
| Abstract: | | As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place. |
| Subjects: | | World Bank aid effectiveness political influence United Nations Security Council |
| JEL: | | O19 O11 : F35 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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