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dc.contributor.authorFratzscher, Marcelen_US
dc.contributor.authorReynaud, Julienen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:19:31Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:19:31Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39008-
dc.description.abstractThe International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we analyze the content of Article IV Public Information Notices (PIN), and second, we use the financial market reaction to the release PINs as tools to identify the role of political economy factors for IMF surveillance. For a set of emerging market economies, the paper finds that financial markets react more favorable to PIN releases for politically influential member countries. Moreover, IMF surveillance appears to be systematically more favorable for countries with larger IMF loans outstanding, consistent with the finding in the literature that the IMF may engage in 'defensive surveillance'.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Public Choice 3089en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.jelF30en_US
dc.subject.jelF40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIMFen_US
dc.subject.keywordsurveillanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsovereign spreadsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancial marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordemerging market economiesen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Wirtschaftsorganisationen_US
dc.subject.stwAufsichtsbehördeen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwAnkündigungseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwBörsenkursen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Anleiheen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoprämieen_US
dc.subject.stwZinsstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwAufstrebende Märkteen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleIMF surveillance and financial markets: A political economy analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn630008051en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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