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Title:IMF surveillance and financial markets: A political economy analysis PDF Logo
Authors:Fratzscher, Marcel
Reynaud, Julien
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper Public Choice 3089
Abstract:The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we analyze the content of Article IV Public Information Notices (PIN), and second, we use the financial market reaction to the release PINs as tools to identify the role of political economy factors for IMF surveillance. For a set of emerging market economies, the paper finds that financial markets react more favorable to PIN releases for politically influential member countries. Moreover, IMF surveillance appears to be systematically more favorable for countries with larger IMF loans outstanding, consistent with the finding in the literature that the IMF may engage in 'defensive surveillance'.
Subjects:IMF
surveillance
political economy
sovereign spreads
financial markets
emerging market economies
JEL:F33
F30
F40
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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