Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38987 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3112
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic substitutes, which provides a powerful rationale for staggering. We show that for realistic parameter values, there is a continuum of possible equilibria with various degrees of staggering of long contracts. If the contracting cost is not too large, then the lowest possible degree of staggering decreases with the contracting cost and increases with monetary uncertainty.
Subjects: 
uniform staggering
nonuniform staggering
monetary policy shocks
strategic substitutability
wage contracts
contract duration
JEL: 
E31
E32
J41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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