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dc.contributor.authorRazîn, Assafen_US
dc.contributor.authorSadka, Efraimen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:19:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:19:04Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38979-
dc.description.abstractIt is often argued that tax competition may lead to a 'race to the bottom'. This result may indeed hold in the case of factor mobility (such as capital). However, in this paper we emphasize the unique feature of labor migration, that may nullify the'race to the bottom' hypothesis. Labor migration is governed not only by net-of-tax factor rewards, but rather importantly also by the benefits that the welfare state provides. The paper analyzes fiscal competition with and without migration in a two-country, political-economy, model with labor of different skills. The paper assigns an active fiscal role for both the host and the source countries. It models the host country stylistically as a core EU welfare state, with tax financed benefits and migration policies, and the migration source country as an accession country (following the EU enlargement to 27 states), with its own welfare (tax-benefit) policy. We let these two asymmetric countries (in terms of their productivity) engage in fiscal competition. Using numerical simulations we examine how the migration and tax policies are shaped, and how they are affected by whether the skilled or the unskilled are in power. As the driving force behind migration is a productivity gap, we also analyze the implications of the productivity gap for the design of migration and tax policies.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Public Finance 3075en_US
dc.subject.jelF22en_US
dc.subject.jelH20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwSozialstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwMigrationspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Arbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwZwei-Länder-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktivitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staaten (Osteuropa)en_US
dc.titleFiscal and migration competitionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn629644675en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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