|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38978
|
| | |
| Title: | | The interaction of legal and social norm enforcement  |
| Authors: | | Kube, Sebastian Traxler, Christian |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper Public Finance 3091 |
| Abstract: | | Although legal sanctions are often non-deterrent, we frequently observe compliance with 'mild laws'. A possible explanation is that the incentives to comply are shaped not only by legal, but also by social sanctions. This paper employs a novel experimental approach to study the link between legal and social norm enforcement. We analyze whether the two institutions are complements or substitutes. Our results show that legal sanctions partially crowd out social norm enforcement. The welfare effect from mild laws is positive, however, as a higher level of compliance is achieved at lower enforcement costs. |
| Subjects: | | social sanctions legal sanctions norm enforcement mild laws laboratory experiment VCM public goods |
| JEL: | | K42 C90 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38978
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|