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dc.contributor.authorAidt, Tokeen
dc.contributor.authorDutta, Jayasrien
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:59Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38972-
dc.description.abstractWe study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3022en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen
dc.subject.keywordlocal public goodsen
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordperformance votingen
dc.subject.keywordturnout uncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordelectoral accountabilityen
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen
dc.subject.stwLokales öffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten
dc.subject.stwWiederwahlen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleFiscal federalism and electoral accountability-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn626619092en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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