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dc.contributor.authorAidt, Tokeen_US
dc.contributor.authorDutta, Jayasrien_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:59Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38972-
dc.description.abstractWe study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Public Choice 3022en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordlocal public goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordperformance votingen_US
dc.subject.keywordturnout uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordelectoral accountabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwLokales öffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwWiederwahlen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleFiscal federalism and electoral accountabilityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn626619092en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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