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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38961
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| Title: | | Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values  |
| Authors: | | Biran, Omer Forges, Françoise |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper Industrial Organisation 3067 |
| Abstract: | | We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice. |
| Subjects: | | auctions Bayesian game collusion core partition function game |
| JEL: | | C71 C72 D44 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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