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Title:Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger PDF Logo
Authors:Sadiraj, Vjollca
Tuinstra, Jan
van Winden, Frans
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper Public Choice 3014
Abstract:Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Subjects:spatial voting models
electoral competition
winning set
interest groups
JEL:D71
D72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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