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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen_US
dc.contributor.authorHerrmann, Benedikten_US
dc.contributor.authorThöni, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:18Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:18Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38927-
dc.description.abstractDoes the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (American Sociological Review 2000, pp. 19-51)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Public Choice 3070en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelD79en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelZ10en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordhuman cooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordcultureen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimental public good gamesen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwKulturpsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwSozialpsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleCulture and cooperationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn629516774en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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