Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38926 
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dc.contributor.authorEichner, Thomasen
dc.contributor.authorPethig, Rüdigeren
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-18-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:17Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38926-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines strategic incentives to subsidize green energy in a group of countries that operates an international carbon emissions trading scheme. Welfare-maximizing national governments have the option to discriminate against energy from fossil fuels by subsidizing green energy, although in our model green energy promotion is not efficiency enhancing. The cases of small and large countries turn out to exhibit significantly differences. While small countries refrain from subsidizing green energy and thus implement the efficient allocation, large permit-importing countries subsidize green energy in order to influence the permit price in their favor.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3083en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelQ42en
dc.subject.jelQ48en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordemissions tradingen
dc.subject.keywordblack energyen
dc.subject.keywordgreen energyen
dc.subject.keywordenergy subsidiesen
dc.subject.stwFörderung regenerativer Energienen
dc.subject.stwStrategische Handelspolitiken
dc.subject.stwKohlendioxiden
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen
dc.subject.stwInternationalen
dc.subject.stwLandesgrößeen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInternational carbon emissions trading and strategic incentives to subsidize green energy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn629656428en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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