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dc.contributor.authorEichner, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorPethig, Rüdigeren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:17Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38926-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines strategic incentives to subsidize green energy in a group of countries that operates an international carbon emissions trading scheme. Welfare-maximizing national governments have the option to discriminate against energy from fossil fuels by subsidizing green energy, although in our model green energy promotion is not efficiency enhancing. The cases of small and large countries turn out to exhibit significantly differences. While small countries refrain from subsidizing green energy and thus implement the efficient allocation, large permit-importing countries subsidize green energy in order to influence the permit price in their favor.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Energy and Climate Economics 3083en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelQ42en_US
dc.subject.jelQ48en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordemissions tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordblack energyen_US
dc.subject.keywordgreen energyen_US
dc.subject.keywordenergy subsidiesen_US
dc.subject.stwFörderung regenerativer Energienen_US
dc.subject.stwStrategische Handelspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKohlendioxiden_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationalen_US
dc.subject.stwLandesgrößeen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInternational carbon emissions trading and strategic incentives to subsidize green energyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn629656428en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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