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dc.contributor.authorChirinko, Robert S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWilson, Daniel J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:16Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:16Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38925-
dc.description.abstractThe standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. We depart from this assumption by allowing for the possibility that policymakers also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses. This extension to the standard strategic tax competition model implies that business contributions may affect not only the levels of equilibrium tax rates but also the slope of the tax reaction function between jurisdictions, thus enhancing or retarding the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. The model is estimated with panel data for 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions. Among other results, we document a significant direct effect of business contributions on tax policy; the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution in terms of lower state corporate taxes is approximately $6.65.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Public Finance 3121en_US
dc.subject.jelH70en_US
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbusiness campaign contributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstate business tax policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcapital mobilityen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwTeilstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleCan lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among US Statesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn631387730en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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