Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38917
Authors: 
Oprea, Ryan
Henwood, Keith
Friedman, Daniel
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Empirical and Theoretical Methods 3129
Abstract: 
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive predictions of evolutionary game theory.
Subjects: 
evolutionary dynamics
Hawk-Dove game
game theory
laboratory experiment
continuous time game
JEL: 
C73
C92
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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