Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38915
Authors: 
Bordignon, Massimo
Piazza, Santino
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Public Finance 3100
Abstract: 
A 1999 reform allowed Italian Mayors to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax). Theoretical analysis suggests this should give incompetent Mayors a less costly way to hide themselves, so allowing them to be more easily re-elected. An empirical analysis on Piedmont municipalities confirms these hypotheses.
Subjects: 
partial decentralization
fiscal federalism
transparency
political behavior
JEL: 
H71
H77
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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