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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38898
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Furusawa, Taiji | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Hori, Kazumi | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Wooton, Ian | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-06-01 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-18T11:18:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-18T11:18:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38898 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We examine how the bidding environment may affect the outcome of tax competition between two countries (or two regions) in attracting a firm's foreign direct investment (FDI).We compare the equilibrium location choice and payoffs from an English auction, with both complete and incomplete information, relative to those in the traditional setting of a sealed-bid first-price auction. We find that an English auction leads to more aggressive bidding in 'race beyond the bottom,' where the nations may bid beyond their own valuations of the FDI. We also discuss the roles of auction protocol and information asymmetry on the auction outcome. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper Trade Policy 3049 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F12 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H25 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | tax competition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | foreign direct investment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | international ownership | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | English auction | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | information asymmetry | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Direktinvestition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Standortwettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuerwettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Standortpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Auktionstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Asymmetrische Information | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | A race beyond the bottom: The nature of bidding for a firm | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 627064302 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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