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dc.contributor.authorJacquet, Laurenceen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-19-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:00Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38897-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the optimal income redistribution and optimal monitoring when disability benefits are intended for disabled people but when some able agents with high distaste for work mimic them (type II errors). Labor supply responses are at the extensive margin and endogenous take-up costs may burden disabled recipients (because of either a reputational externality caused by cheaters or a snowball effect). Under paternalistic utilitarian preferences that do not compensate for distaste for work, inactive disabled recipients should obtain strictly lower consumption than disabled workers. The cost of monitoring supports adoption of an Earned Income Tax Credit. However, and surprisingly, with or without take-up costs, even if perfect monitoring is costless, it proves optimal to have type II errors. These results are robust to a utilitarian criterion. The paper provides numerical simulations calibrated on U.S. data.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3018en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordoptimal income taxationen
dc.subject.keywordtaggingen
dc.subject.keywordtake-upen
dc.subject.keywordextensive marginen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Transferen
dc.subject.stwErwerbsunfähigkeitsrenteen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTake it or leave it: take-up, optimal transfer programs, and monitoring-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn626395461en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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