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dc.contributor.authorJacquet, Laurenceen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:00Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38897-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the optimal income redistribution and optimal monitoring when disability benefits are intended for disabled people but when some able agents with high distaste for work mimic them (type II errors). Labor supply responses are at the extensive margin and endogenous take-up costs may burden disabled recipients (because of either a reputational externality caused by cheaters or a snowball effect). Under paternalistic utilitarian preferences that do not compensate for distaste for work, inactive disabled recipients should obtain strictly lower consumption than disabled workers. The cost of monitoring supports adoption of an Earned Income Tax Credit. However, and surprisingly, with or without take-up costs, even if perfect monitoring is costless, it proves optimal to have type II errors. These results are robust to a utilitarian criterion. The paper provides numerical simulations calibrated on U.S. data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Public Finance 3018en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal income taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordtaggingen_US
dc.subject.keywordtake-upen_US
dc.subject.keywordextensive marginen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Transferen_US
dc.subject.stwErwerbsunfähigkeitsrenteen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTake it or leave it: take-up, optimal transfer programs, and monitoringen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn626395461en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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