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dc.contributor.authorCremer, Helmuthen_US
dc.contributor.authorGahvari, Firouzen_US
dc.contributor.authorPestieau, Pierreen_US
dc.description.abstractWhen accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity, the tax administration should partition the population into two groups: One consisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second group a first-best tax schedule. The solution implies that receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals will necessarily face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100% and may even be negative.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Public Finance 3094en_US
dc.subject.keywordaccidental bequestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordestate taxen_US
dc.subject.keywordfirst besten_US
dc.subject.keywordsecond besten_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.titleAccidental bequests: A curse for the rich and a boon for the pooren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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