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dc.contributor.authorvan der Ploeg, Fredericken_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:17:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:17:54Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38889-
dc.description.abstractFor a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. The theory suggests that adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Resources and Environment 2981en_US
dc.subject.jelE20en_US
dc.subject.jelF32en_US
dc.subject.jelO13en_US
dc.subject.jelQ01en_US
dc.subject.jelQ32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexhaustible resourcesen_US
dc.subject.keywordHotelling ruleen_US
dc.subject.keywordHartwick ruleen_US
dc.subject.keywordcapitalen_US
dc.subject.keywordsustainable consumptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfractionalizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordseepageen_US
dc.subject.keywordinsecure property rightsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddifferential gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordgenuine savingen_US
dc.subject.keywordadjusted net savingen_US
dc.subject.stwRessourcenökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwRohstoffressourcenen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwHotelling-Regelen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleRapacious resource depletion, excessive investment and insecure property rightsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn621466638en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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