Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38880
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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:54Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38880-
dc.description.abstractThe Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic interdependence, i.e., the optimal labor supply of any one individual does not depend on the labor supply of others. It has been argued by Piketty (1993) that this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach first-best allocations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms. In this paper, we assess the validity of Piketty's critique in an independent private values model. As a main result, we show that the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism, or, equivalently, a Mirrleesian income tax system.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,14en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Income Taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the optimality of optimal income taxationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn625804074en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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