Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38879
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2010,25
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the job assignment problem faced by a firm when workers' skills are distributed along several dimensions and jobs require different skills to varying extent. I derive optimal assignment rules with and without slot constraints, and show that under certain circumstances workers may get promoted although in their new job they are expected to be less productive than in their old job. This can be interpreted as a version of the Peter Principle which states that workers get promoted up to their level of incompetence.
Subjects: 
job assignment
worker selection
internal hiring
Peter Principle
slot constraints
multi-dimensional skills
JEL: 
J0
J62
M12
M51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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