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dc.contributor.authorLang, Matthiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorWambach, Achimen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:51Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38877-
dc.description.abstractMost insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy, as the credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports might act as a powerful deterrent. We show that uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance claims. If, in addition, the auditing costs of the insurers are heterogeneous, it can be optimal not to commit, because committing to a fraud detection strategy eliminates the ambiguity. Thus strategic ambiguity can be an equilibrium outcome in the market and competition does not force firms to provide the relevant information. This finding is also relevant in other auditing settings and complements the literature on games with ambiguity-averse players.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,24en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52303-
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelK4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFrauden_US
dc.subject.keywordCommitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordAmbiguityen_US
dc.subject.keywordStrategic Uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordCostly State Verificationen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsbetrugen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe fog of fraud: Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn627601650en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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