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dc.contributor.authorGrechenig, Kristoffelen_US
dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorThöni, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:47Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38876-
dc.description.abstractUnder a great variety of legally relevant circumstances, people have to decide whether or not to cooperate, when they face an incentive to defect. The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce pro-social behavior. Experimental evidence on voluntary public good provision shows that the option to punish others substantially improves cooperation, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about others' behavior. We investigate punishment in a world with 'reasonable doubt' about others' contributions. Interestingly, people reveal a high willingness to punish even if their information about cooperation rates is inaccurate, or noisy. If there is some non-trivial degree of noise, punishment (1) cannot maintain high contributions and (2) reduces welfare even below the level of a setting without punishment. Our findings suggest that sufficient information accuracy about others' behavior is crucial for he efficiency of sanction mechanisms. If a situation is characterized by low information accuracy, precluding sanctions can be optimal.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,11en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Law & Economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordEnforcement under Uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.stwStrafeen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titlePunishment despite reasonable doubt: A public goods experiment with uncertainty over contributionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn62372426Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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