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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorKurschilgen, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:46Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38875-
dc.description.abstractThe market for copyrights is characterised by a highly skewed distribution of profits: very few movies, books and songs generate huge profits, whereas the great bulk barely manages to recover production cost. At the moment when the owner of intellectual property grants a licence ('ex ante'), neither party knows the true value of the traded commodity. A seemingly odd norm from German copyright law, the so-called bestseller provision, stipulates that the seller of a licence has a legally enforceable right to a bonus in case the work ('ex post') turns out a blockbuster. We experimentally explore the effect of the provision on market prices, on the number of deals struck and on perceived fairness. Our results show that the provision leads to lower prices for copyrights. More copyrights trade. The buyers perceive less ex-post unfairness.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,29en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordCopyrighten_US
dc.subject.keywordUncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.stwUrheberrechten_US
dc.subject.stwMedienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwPreisen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwLizenzvergabeen_US
dc.subject.stwProvisionen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleFairness ex ante & ex post: The benefits of renegotiation in media marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn630545987en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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